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AGAINST MARRIAGE
What is marriage? In the debate surrounding same-sex marriage, the
central term has gone undefined. Using the Hawaii Supreme Court's
decision in Baehr v. Lewin1 as a starting point, this Note argues that
marriage lacks legal as well as experiential coherence. A series of legal
and social moves intended, on the one hand, to preserve the dominance
of heterosexuality over gays and lesbians and, on the other, to allow,
heterosexuals to escape the dominance of heterosexuality over themselves,
has left little conceptual space for marriage. That is, to speak of "extending marriage" to same-sex couples creates the illusion that marriage is a
stable, unitary entity. If we look instead to the social and legal pressures
by which marriage is simultaneously made and unmade, it becomes clear
that marriage is a place-holder for a series of idealized value judgments
about our intimate lives.
This Note, then, is a polemic "against" that. When I say I am against
marriage, I do not also say that I am against companionship, or affection,
or mutual support, or, for that matter, sex. Quite the contrary. I am,
however, against a reifying discourse of marriage that consumes the opportunity to question the purposes and value of marriage. The time gays
and lesbians have spent creating our relationships from scratch has taught
us something about love. It seems a shame to discard this knowledge for
the increasingly out-moded logic of marriage. In the question of same-sex
marriage lies more than the question of who can marry. In same-sex
marriage lies the more profound question of whether anyone can or should
marry, which in turn creates the opportunity to re-think "marriage" in
ways that are at once radical and mundane. Radical, because they go to
the very structure of state intervention in intimate affairs, and mundane
because they ask whether this state intervention approximates the needs
of the daily experience of intimacy.
I start with a discussion of Baehr v. Lewin. Having opened the door
to same-sex marriage, Baehr has, for obvious reasons, been embraced as
an advance for the rights of gay men and lesbians, but it is far less a gay
rights case than a gender equality case. Although Baehr does not fully
explore the interplay between the ban on same-sex marriage and the role
marriage has played in creating and maintaining systems of gender subordination, it provides all the cases and arguments necessary for an exploration of the question of what marriage is.
I then examine the duality of marriage jurisprudence in order to show
its legal incoherence. This jurisprudence, in which marriage appears to
gain the status of a fundamental right, characterizes marriage both as a
'852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
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bundle of state-created and state-dependent benefits and as an essentialized, pre-state relationship. I conclude that, at best, the former is a complete constitutional anomaly and the latter an expression of structural
heterosexism. As an implicit critique of tradition-based fundamental rights
tests, I look at marriage and divorce rates and related statistics, and
conclude that as it lacks theoretical coherence, marriage also has no
experiential coherence. Whatever tradition of marriage heterosexuals have
created, it bears little resemblance to the traditional marriage heterosexuals envision when they deny marriage to us. Simultaneously, I explore
briefly the various ways in which same-sex couples and their loved ones
have structured their relationships in the absence of affirming state intervention. Although it is problematic to characterize as "marriage" relationships that exist outside marriage, they give the lie to the implicit absence
of a tradition of same-sex relationships in a tradition-oriented test.
The larger point of these two sections is that the incoherence of
marriage law means marriage is no magic wand to cure the legal inequality of gay men and lesbians. It may very well create whole new levels of
legal inequality, both among gay men and lesbians, and between gays and
heterosexuals: the benefits associated with marriage are likely to come in
a piecemeal fashion because, more basically, marriage does not create
social approval but merely stands in for it. The experience of gay and
lesbian relationships suggests that marriage, as part of a larger political
strategy, is a questionable strategy. It is unclear whether same-sex marriage will successfully assimilate us into the mainstream of American life
(whatever that is), and it is unclear whether that assimilation represents
political success.
The work of deciding how-and why-the state will regulate our
intimate relationships is upon us, and insistence on "marriage" will not
help. While it is true that the denial of same-sex marriage is intended to
discriminate against gays and lesbians (and does), we should be wary
about imposing a perfect symmetry on that dynamic. Baehr advances us
in the right direction, but it goes only so far, and the arguments we rely
on to argue for same-sex marriage often implicitly take heterosexism at
face value. We can and should adopt a more critical stance with respect
to both our desire for marriage and the rhetoric by which it is denied to us.
I. Baehr v. Lewin
In December 1990, three same-sex couples-Ninia Baehr and Genora
Dancel, Tammy Rodrigues and Antoinette Pregil, and Pat Lagon and
Joseph Melilio-applied to Hawaii's Department of Health for marriage
licenses.2 The Department of Health denied their applications because
2

Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 49 (Haw. 1993).
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"'the law of Hawaii does' 3not treat a union between members of the same
'

sex as a valid marriage.
The couples brought suit in state court, claiming violations of their
rights to privacy and to equal protection under Article I, Sections 64 and
5,5 respectively, of the Hawaii Constitution. John Lewin, Director of the

Department of Health, moved for judgment on the pleadings,6 which the
7 The couples appealed, and the Hawaii SuHawaii circuit ccurt granted.
8
reversed.
preme Court
A plurality of the court 9 held that although same-sex couples do not
have a fundamental privacy right to marry under the Hawaii Constitution, 10 the Hawaii marriage law" is presumptively unconstitutional because it creates a sex-based classification. 12 A majority of the court agreed
that "any [s]tate action that discriminates against a person because of his
or her 'sex' is subject to strict scrutiny,"1 3 and remanded the case to the
trial court for a showing by the state that the marriage statute "furthers
3Id. at 49-50 & n.3.
4"The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed without
the showing of a compelling state interest. The legislature shall take affirmative steps to
implement this right.' HAW. CONsT. art. I, § 6.
5"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,
nor be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the person's
civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race, religion,
sex or ancestry." Id. art. I, § 5. Several other states' constitutions have similar provisions,
making it possible that in at least some of them similar challenges are possible: CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 8; COLO. CONST. art. II,§ 29; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20; ILL. CONsT. art.
I, §§ 17, 18; LA. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 12; MASS. CONsT. art. CVI; MONT. CONST. art. II,
§ 4; N.H. CONsT. art. I, § 2; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18; TIx. CONST. art. I, § 3a; VA.
art. I, § 11; WYO. CONsT. art. I, § 3.
CONsT.
6
Baehr, 852 P.2d at 51.
7Id. at 52.
8Id. at 68.
9 Only two justices of the Hawaii Supreme Court heard the case from start to finish.
The case was heard by Acting Chief Justice Moon, Justice Levinson, Chief Judge Bums
of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (who replaced Chief Justice Lum, who was recused),
Judge Heen of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (who replaced Justice Klein, who was
also recused), and Retired Justice Hayashi (who was assigned by reason of a vacancy).
Id. at 48. Justice Levinson wrote the plurality opinion, in which Acting Chief Justice Moon
joined. Chief Judge Burns concurred in the result and wrote a separate opinion. Judge
Heen dissented; Retired Justice Hayashi, whose temporary appointment expired before the
opinions were filed, would have joined Judge Heen's dissenting opinion. Id.
When the court granted Lewin's motion for clarification, Acting Chief Justice Moon
had become Chief Justice on the retirement of former Chief Justice Lum, who retired
before the opinion was issued. Retired Justice Hayashi had been replaced by Justice
Nakayama. Thus, Chief Justice Moon, Justices Levinson and Nakayama and Chief Judge
Bums of the Intermediate Court of Appeals issued the clarification, with Chief Judge Burns
also concurring separately. Id. at 74-75. Judge Heen of the Intermediate Court of Appeals,
who had dissented originally, did not join the grant of clarification. Id. at 75.
'Old.at 57.
HAW. REv.STAT. § 572-1 (Michie 1993).
11
12 Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67.
13Id. at 69 (Bums, J., concurring) (Chief Judge, Intermediate Court of Appeals, sitting
by designation); id. at 67 (plurality).
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compelling state interests and is narrowly
drawn to avoid unnecessary
14
abridgements of constitutional rights"
Because the strict scrutiny test is a demanding standard-at the United
States Supreme Court level, for example, it has been met in the context
of racial discrimination only in the case in which it was developedL--it
is possible that Baehr, ultimately, will make Hawaii the first state to marry
16
same-sex couples.
14
1d. at 68. Chief Judge Bums, concurring, would have held that the marriage statute
constituted invidious discrimination only if a factual determination showed that heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, and asexuality are "aspect[s] of a person's 'sex' that
[are] 'biologically fated." Id. at 69-70. Lewin moved for, and a majority of the court
issued, see supra note 9, a clarifying opinion indicating that on remand the sole question
would be whether the statute could meet the strict scrutiny test. Id. at 74. Chief Judge
Bums concurred in the grant of the motion with respect to the plurality opinion and denied
the motion with respect to his own opinion, in effect withdrawing it. Id. at 75.
15Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("[A]II legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not
to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject
them 6to the most rigid scrutiny.").
' Because each state's conflict of laws doctrine determines whether it will recognize
Hawaii same-sex marriages, the best that can be given here is an overview of the relevant
analysis: "[a] marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage
was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public
policy of another state which had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the
marriage at the time of the marriage:' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws
§ 283(2) (1971). This aspect of Baehr makes it threatening to some commentators.

The pressure to ease the ban on gays in the military is getting all of the attention,
while the real, dramatic change is brewing in a small state thousands of miles
away. Hawaii may be the first state to legalize same-sex marriages, but it won't
be the last one. Nor can we prevent its effects from being felt in Pennsylvania.
Patricia G. Miller, Hawaiian Courts' Rulings on Constitutionalityof Gay Marriage Ban
Could Affect Other States, PITTS. POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 21, 1993, at F5.
However, the "strong public policy" exception will be a difficult hurdle. Courts have
been quite willing to equate homosexuality with the commission of sodomy in contexts
in which the crime of sodomy would be a disqualification. See, e.g., Padula v. Webster,
822 F.2d 97, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (employment with F.B.I.); In re Opinion of the Justices,
530 A.2d 21, 24 (N.H. 1987) (adoption). Cf. also cases cited infra note 111. Thus, after
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), every state that has a same-sex sodomy law
can plausibly argue that it need not recognize a Hawaii same-sex marriage because it has
a constitutionally sound public policy against sodomy, an act likely to be committed in a
same-sex marriage.
Alternatively, courts decline to recognize a marriage when it was performed out of
state to avoid the state's ban on that particular form of marriage. E.g., Wilkins v.
Zelichowski, 140 A.2d 65, 69 (N.J. 1958) (annulling marriage of under-age couple
performed in Indiana on grounds that they were married in Indiana to avoid New Jersey
law). Same-sex marriages of non-Hawaii residents performed in Hawaii would, by
definition, constitute such marriages.
Given that Baehr disavows a gay rights position, Hawaii's interest in the recognition
elsewhere of a same-sex marriage performed in-state could be characterized as weak.
Hawaii would permit same-sex marriages, not because it has adopted a public policy
endorsing homosexual marriages, but rather because they are a necessary incident to its
public policy against sex discrimination.
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A. Baehr as a Gay Rights Case

No court, including the Baehr court, has yet found a right to samesex marriage per se;17 rather, all except for Baehr have held that only
opposite-sex couples can, and therefore have a right to, marry. The Baehr
court had to distinguish a formidable body of precedent simply to establish the possibility that same-sex couples could marry. The court distinguished De Santo v. Barnsley's as a common-law marriage case. 19 It
rejected the reasoning of Jones v. Hallahan20 and Singer v. Hara21 as
"tortured and conclusory sophistry."22 Baker v. Nelson23 it distinguished
as having raised no state constitutional question. 24 However, the chief
distinction between De Santo, Hallahan, Singer, and Baker, on the one
hand, and Baehr, on the other, is this: Baehr is the first case in which a
court imagines that same-sex couples could marry.
The Baehr court anchored its privacy analysis in the United States
Supreme Court's marriage jurisprudence. The Hawaii Supreme Court noted
that "article I, section 6 of the Hawaii Constitution encompasses all of
the fundamental rights expressly recognized as being subsumed within the
privacy protections of the United States Constitution. 25 Since the Supreme Court found a right to marry in the right to privacy, 26 the Baehr
court found a right to marry in the Hawaii Constitution's right to privacy.
The Hawaii Supreme Court was initially uncertain whether or not the
Supreme Court's "right to marriage" constituted a single right encompassing both marriage and procreation. 27 The Court decided that the discussion
17 E.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (persons of same
sex are "incapable" of entering marital state, and no constitutional issue is implicated by
this definitional barrier); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) (United
States Constitution does not require the recognition of same-sex marriage), appeal
dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952, 957 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1984) (state law did not recognize same-sex common-law marriages); Singer v. Hara, 522
P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (Washington Constitution's Equal Rights Amendment does not require same-sex marriage).
Additionally, the attorneys-general of several states have interpreted their marriage
laws to provide only for opposite-sex marriage: 190 Ala. Op. Att'y Gen. 30 (1983); 93
Idaho Op. Att'y Gen. 11 (1993); 77 Kan. Op. Att'y Gen. 248 (1977); 92 La. Op. Att'y
Gen. 699(A) (1992); 84 Me. Op. Att'y Gen. 28 (1984); 1978 Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. 684
(1978); 1977 Neb. Op. Att'y Gen. 170 (1977); 1983 S.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 85 (1983); 1976
S.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 423 (1976); 88 Tenn. Op. Att'y Gen. 43 (1988); 1977-78 Va. Rep.
Att'y Gen. 154 (1977).
18476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
19Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 61 (Haw. 1993).
20501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973).
21522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
22
Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63.
23 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
24
Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61.
25
Id. at 55.
26
1d. at 55-56 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978)).
27
1d. at 56. The Supreme Court's decision in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
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29
in Zablocki v. Redhai 2 8 and Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson of
marriage in the context of procreation could only mean the two were
inextricably linked in the federal context, and therefore "the federal construct of the fundamental right to marry... presently contemplates unions between men and women."30
Although the Hawaii Supreme Court noted its freedom to interpret
rights protected by the Hawaii Constitution more broadly than the United
States Supreme Court interprets those protected under the federal Constitution, 31 it also noted that its privacy doctrine follows federal privacy
doctrine. 32 Relying on the standard developed by the United States Supreme Court in Palko v. Connecticut,33 the Baehr court held that

a right to same-sex marriage is [not] so rooted in the traditions
and collective conscience of our people that failure to recognize
it would violate the fundamental principles of liberty and justice
that lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.
Neither do we believe that a right to same-sex marriage is
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such 34that neither
liberty nor justice would exist if it were sacrificed.
The Baehr court carefully distinguished the gender composition of a
couple from their sexuality: "parties to 'a union between a man and a
woman' may or may not be homosexuals. Parties to a same-sex marriage
could theoretically be either homosexuals or heterosexuals. '35 The court's
rhetorical move takes gay men and lesbians out of the discussion, which
may make the ultimate result more palatable, but it obscures the extent to
which homophobia motivates the ban on same-sex marriage.
This distinction is undercut by the conflation of marriage and procreation that informs the plurality's privacy holding. If the Baehr court
(overturning law prohibiting use of contraceptives by unmarried persons), does, however,
offer some instruction in this regard: "[ijf the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental

intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child." Id. at 453. Eisenstadt establishes that procreative decisions are constitutionally divorced, so to speak, from marriage.
28434 U.S. 374 (1978) (overturning law preventing fathers with unmet child support
obligations from marrying).

29316 U.S. 535 (1942) (overturning law calling for sterilization of persons convicted
of certain
crimes).
30
Baehr, 852 P.2d at 56.
31
Id. at 57.
32
Id.

33302 U.S. 319 (1937).
34
Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57.
35
1d. at 51 n.11. This was apparently also the strategy of the plaintiffs, who did not
allege that they were gay or lesbian. Id. at 52 n.12.
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really believed that the sexualities of the parties to a marriage need not
necessarily correspond to the gender composition of the couple, then the
presence of procreation as an expression of that sexuality in the Supreme
Court's marriage jurisprudence is immaterial, because then the privacy
right to marry would include, but not be limited to, procreation for purposes of privacy right analysis. If, on the other hand, procreation means
that the sexual orientation of the parties does bear a legally significant
relation to the gender composition of the couple, then Baehr's distinction
dodges the central question: whether a privacy right to marry a person of
the opposite sex means much (or anything) to gays and lesbians.
B. Baehr as a Gender Equality Case
The Baehr plurality rejected the dissent's argument that the Hawaii36
marriage statute "treats everyone alike and applies equally to both sexes'
on its
Since the statute's terms are gender-specific, the court found3 that
7
face Hawaii's marriage law created a sex-based classification.
38
The dissent relied on Philips v. Wisconsin Personnel Commission,
in which a lesbian state employee argued that the state's failure to extend
benefits to her female partner, whom she could not marry, constituted sex
discrimination. 39 The Philips court disagreed,40 in effect finding that the
relevant statute created a distinction between married heterosexuals and
unmarried persons. 41 Philips and Singer v. Hara,42 upon which the dissent
also relied, adopted an analysis the United States Supreme Court rejected
43
at least with respect to antimiscegenation laws in Loving v. Virginia,
when it dismissed Virginia's argument that punishing whites and blacks44
equally under its antimiscegenation statute was not racial discrimination.
Courts have heretofore uniformly rejected analogies to Loving in
same-sex marriage cases: 45 "in commonsense and in a constitutional sense,
36

1d. at 71 (Heen, J., dissenting) (Judge, Intermediate Court of Appeals, sitting by

designation).
37
Id. at 60.
38482 N.W.2d 121 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
39

Cf. Hinman v. Department of Personnel Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (Ct. App. 1985)

(upholding government employer's denial of benefits to plaintiff's same-sex partner over

orientation discrimination argument).
sexual
40
Philips, 482 N.W.2d at 127-28.
41
Id. at 127. Other courts have also made this kind of question-begging distinction.
E.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 n.20 (1974) (California's disability insurance

program, which excluded pregnancy, did not discriminate on the basis of sex because it

"divide[dJ potential recipients into two groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons").

42522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
43 388 U.S. 1 (1966); see also Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993) (drawing

analogy to Loving).

44See Loving, 388 U.S. at 13-15.
45

This Note will not discuss the antimiscegenation analogy directly, as others have

512

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

[Vol. 29

there is a clear distinction between a marital restriction based merely upon
race and one based upon the fundamental difference in sex." 46 Yet surely
those who originally enacted the antimiscegenation laws believed they
based their marital restrictions not "merely" upon race but upon a difference more "fundamental." In declining to follow the circularity of the
47 that
argument in Jones v. Hallahan
same-sex couples cannot marry
because they are same-sex couples, 48 the Hawaii Supreme Court accepted
the analogy to Loving.49 Loving at least in theory represented a victory
for African-Americans, but since Baehr does not reject the necessity of
opposite-sex couples, it does not reject heterosexist supremacy in the way
that Loving rejected white supremacy5 0
Baehr's core holding is that gender classifications are "suspect" classifications subject to strict scrutiny under the Hawaii Constitution's Equal
Protection doctrine. 5 1 I do not, however, take the Hawaii Supreme Court's
acceptance of the sex discrimination argument to be a real challenge to
the construction of marriage around stereotyped gender roles. "Legalization of lesbian and gay marriage poses a threat to gender systems, not
simply to antilesbian and antigay bigotry' 52 Indeed, the Baehr court
found that there is no fundamental right to same-sex marriage per se
precisely because of the salience of a particular gender system (procreation in an opposite-sex marriage) in its understanding of federal marriage
doctrine.
Even if the State of Hawaii is able to meet its burden on the specific
question of same-sex marriage, Baehr is a substantial legal advance for
sex-discrimination plaintiffs in Hawaii, given the outcome-determinative
effect of the strict scrutiny test. However, for gays and lesbians as such,
Baehr's interstitial approach to gay rights removes homosexuality from
the discussion of same-sex marriage at a level deeper than rhetoric. Paraalready developed it. E.g., Andrew Koppelman, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law
as Sex Discrimination,98 YALE L.J. 145 (1988); Mark Strasser, Family, Definitions, and

the Constitution: On The AntimiscegenationAnalogy, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 981 (1991);
James Trosino, American Wedding: Same-Sex Marriageand the Miscegenation Analogy,
73 B.U. L. Rnv. 93 (1993).
46Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971). Accord Singer, 522 P.2d at
1191.
47501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973).
48
1d. at 589.
49

Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63 (Haw. 1993).
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); see also William N. Eskridge, A
History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419, 1506 (1993) ("What Loving
was rejecting . . . was not an abstract claim of state power but an ideology of white
supremacy.').
51
Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67. In contrast to its privacy analysis, here the court felt free to
go beyond federal doctrine. Compare id. with Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)
(Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (declining to vote with plurality to hold gender a
suspect
classification).
52
Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW &
SEXUALTrrY 9, 18 (1991) (footnote omitted).
50
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doxically, the linkage between heterosexuality and heterosexual practice
on which Baehr relies to reach its privacy holding lays the groundwork
here for a de-linkage of same-sex marriage from same-sex sex.
States with same-sex sodomy laws may recognize same-sex marriages performed in Hawaii, but only to the extent necessary to vindicate'
a shared public policy against sex discrimination. However, they may not
recognize such marriages to the extent of altering the ban on sodomy, out
of deference to that public policy. The sex discrimination argument can
of course be applied to same-sex sodomy laws, but establishing whether
a legally married same-sex couple can legally be sexually intimate becomes another, and precedentially difficult, 53 lawsuit. Even if same-sex
married couples succeed in gaining a right to have sex, it may easily turn
on the married-unmarried distinction, leaving unmarried gays and lesbians
with no sexual privacy. This would introduce into gay culture, for the first
time, the concept of pre-marital sex.
II. The Jurisprudence of Marriage
The United States Supreme Court has stated that "liberty," as used
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "denotes not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right .. .to marry
55

In a string of dicta, it has described marriage as "fundamental,
as "basic to the perpetuation of a race," 56 as "the foundation of ...
59
58
society," 57 as a "vital personal right,' and as a "fundamental freedom."
aspect, perhaps
These cases suggest that marriage has a constitutional
60
marry.
to
right
fundamental
a
of
level
the
to
rising
S. . :54

53

E.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The distinction may seem nonsensical, but as Bowers itself shows, absurdity is an accepted mode of legal analysis where
gays and lesbians are concerned. The fact pattern of Bowers, in which Michael Hardwick
was arrested in his bedroom while engaged in consensual oral sex with another adult male,
see PETER IRONS, Michael Hardwick v. Michael Bowers, in THE COURAGE OF THEIR
CONVICTIONS 379, 395 (1988), was the nightmare the Supreme Court feared in Griswold

v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) ("Would we allow the police to search the
sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The

very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship:').
Yet far from horrifying the Bowers Court, the police officer's presence seemed fully
warranted, if not required. This juxtaposition shows that for lesbians and gay men, privacy
is not a shield against the state, delimiting its province, but rather a zone that exists (if at
leave of the state.
all) by
54
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
55
ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
56Skinner v. Oklahoma
1d. at 536.
7
5 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888).
58
59

60

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
Id.

See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) ("[Olur past decisions make clear
that the right to marry is of fundamental importance:').
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In the same opinions, however, the Court has characterized marriage
as a creature of state law and subject to the states' control. 61 The Court
has been careful to say that "[not] every state regulation which relates in
any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny."62 Furthermore, though courts have been solicitous of the right to enter into marriage, 63 they have not required absolute access to marriage64 and they have not invalidated every burden on
65
the right.
This gives marriage, as a legal entity, a dual character. On the one
hand, it is a fundamental relationship that precedes the state, and around
which the state is organized. One state court suggested that the state does
not create marriage but merely recognizes a pre-existing status: "[m]arriage was a custom long before the state commenced to issue licenses for
that purpose." 66 On the other hand, as the Baehr court noted, "marriage
is a state-conferred legal status" ' 67 that does not exist apart from the state. 68
Thus, at a general level, this jurisprudence reveals little of what, exactly,
marriage is, and the duality of marriage jurisprudence presents a series of
interlocking questions. Does marriage have a stable, essential character,
independent of the state-conferred benefits that are associated with it? If
61 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 7 (marriage is "a social relation subject to the State's police
power"); Maynard, 125 U.S. at 205 (marriage "has always been subject to the control of
the legislature").
62
Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386.
63See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 97 (1987) (overturning prison regulation
requiring warden's permission before inmates could marry); Langone v. Coughlin, 712 F.
Supp. 1061, 1069 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (overturning prison regulation barring life prisoners
from marrying until parole).
"See, e.g., Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (requirement that
minors receive parental consent before marriage does not infringe their right to marry
because it represents only delay, not denial). Cf.Doe v. Coughlin, 518 N.E.2d 536, 540
(1987)
(Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) does not imply a right to conjugal visits).
65
See, e.g., Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 102 (1977) (upholding Social Security
provision that cut off benefits to disabled recipients who married non-recipients while
continuing benefits to those who married other disabled recipients); Mapes V. United
States, 576 F.2d 896, 901 (Ct. CI. 1978) (upholding differential tax rates for married and
unmarried persons), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978); Drucker v. Commissioner, 697
F.2d 46, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1982) (same); Rappaport v. Katz, 380 F. Supp. 808, 811 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (dismissing claim that state requirement that rings be exchanged burdened right to
marry).
66Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973). See also Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (marriage is "a right of privacy older than the Bill
of Rights").
67Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 58 (Haw. 1993).
68
See Hunter, supra note 52, at 13:

Marriage is, after all, a complete creation of the law, secular or ecclesiastical.
Like the derivative concept of illegitimacy, for example, and unlike parenthood,
it did not and does not exist without the power of the state (or some comparable
social authority) to establish, define, regulate, and restrict it. Beyond such social
constructs, individuals may couple, but they do not "marry."
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so, does a state satisfy the Constitution's mandate merely by "recognizing" a marriage? If marriage has no pre-state core, does the Constitution
then require the states to extend certain benefits in order to make a couple
married, and if so, which benefits?
A. Marriage as Meta-Right: The Bundle of Marital Benefits
If marriage is a set of state-conferred entitlements, then the right to
marry consists of a cluster of benefits that might be called a "meta-right"
The insistence on marriage as a state-law creation necessarily means that
the entitlements that accrue upon marriage will vary from state to state.
At the same time, however, if marriage is a bundle of rights and if the
Constitution protects marriage, then this suggests a federal interest in the
uniformity of the minimal benefits states must give in order to make
couples married. However, constitutional concerns of federalism might
well make any federalized system either of marital recognition or of
specific benefits unconstitutional. 69 This suggests that marriage is not a
a right to a
right-in-itself; the Constitution requires the states to give 70
constellation of entitlements, not to any specific entitlement.
The benefits most states grant upon marriage provide practical incentives to marry. Married persons enjoy a wide range of benefits, including
pension benefits, immigration preferences, tax preferences, health insurance benefits, tort rights in each other, intestate succession preferences,
and conjugal visits, to name a few. 7 1 In Hawaii, for example, a married
couple becomes entitled to state income tax preferences, public assistance
for spouses, community property rights, inheritance rights, child custody

69The Court has at least paid lip service to the idea that a state has an "absolute right

to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall
be created, and the causes for which it may be dissolved." Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,
734-35 (1877).
70 Such an implication appears to be at odds with the Court's discussion of similar
matters in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989):
"Our cases have recognized that the Due Process Clauses [of the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments] generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such
aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government

itself may not deprive the individual."-d. at 196. See also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
317-18 (1980) ("Although the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause affords
protection against unwarranted government interference . . . . it does not confer an
entitlement to such [government aid] as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of
that freedom."); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (Due Process Clause of

Amendment imposes no obligation on states to provide adequate housing).
Fourteenth
71

See, e.g., Nitya Duclos, Some Complicating Thoughts on Same-Sex Marriage,1 LAW
& SEXUALITY 31, 52-54 (1991) (listing benefits); Martha Minow, All in the Family & In
all Families: Membership, Loving, and Owing, 95 W. VA. L. REv. 275, 282-83 (1992-93)
(same). It is worth noting that an institution that needs to entice people so heavily to enter

it may be seriously flawed. My thanks to Tanya Herrera for this insight.
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and support awards in divorce proceedings and other post-divorce rights,
72
change of name, and various property and tort rights.
At least one commentator has argued that, as all of the economic
benefits associated with marriage vary by state and are state-created,
married persons cannot have a fundamental right to these benefits. 73 Ordinarily the denial of economic benefits is not constitutionally significant,
and receives only rational basis review. 74 If the denial of these benefits
triggers merely rational basis review, then surely no entitlement to them
arises from a "fundamental right.' ' 75
If marriage is a bundle of benefits and entitlements, and if no fundamental right exists to any particular component of the bundle, then gaining legal benefits for same-sex married couples is likely to be a case-bycase struggle in which
lesbian and gay marriages could easily come to occupy one of
the lower tiers of an already hierarchical social marriage system
....[F]or some lesbians and gay men, gaining legal recognition
of their relationships will not address the most significant rea76
sons for their experiences of inequality and oppression.
Opposite-sex couples receive marriage as a unitary bundle of benefits and
entitlements, but that unitariness can be turned inside-out and its lack of
coherence used against same-sex married couples.
Each benefit associated with marriage is susceptible to an analysis of
the public policy that underlies it. Thus, to the extent that a court can find
that a particular benefit does not belong to the class of benefits that make
a couple married but rather reflects state recognition of the idiosyncracies
of heterosexuality, that benefit can be denied to same-sex couples. At
every point at which same-sex married couples would be seeking the
recognition that their marriages imply, they would be vulnerable to a
distinction between them and heterosexuals and thereby be vulnerable to
devaluation.
72

Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59 (Haw. 1993).
73See Earl M. Maltz, Constitutional Protectionfor the Right to Marry: A Dissenting
View, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv.949, 957 (1992).
74
See id. at 958 (citing United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166
(1980) (retirement benefits); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (AFDC); Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (same)).
75
1d. See also Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 189 (1976) (upholding, on rational
basis76analysis, denial to ex-wife of disability allowance due to ex-husband's disability).
See Duclos, supra note 71, at 51 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 55-56 (noting
that a marriage license does not guarantee a grant of custody of children, especially in the
face of a homophobic judiciary).
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B. Marriageas Essence: The FundamentalRight to Heterosexuality
If the "marriage" that is of constitutional magnitude is not the collection of rights and responsibilities that accrue to the married couple, then
perhaps it consists of a right to determine one's long-term, intimate associations. The theory that marriage has an essential core, one that precedes
the state, has a different tenor: marriage is not so much a service that the
state must provide, but an essentialized entity around which the state must
conform. Yet if that is true, the only "essence" of marriage that accounts
for state-support of opposite-sex couples without including same-sex couples is the gender composition of the couple. At that moment, however,
the definition of marriage ceases to have' any justificatory power. It cannot
be as sparse as the gender composition of its members and yet rise to the
level of a fundamental right, unless one assumes such a couple is heterosexuality tout court.
Whatever heterosexuality is, it is more than the physical proximity
of two bodies. Alternatively, then, one can say "X-companionship, affection, support, sex-is marriage when opposite-sex couples have it, but
not when same-sex couples do." This, however, defines marriage by contrast to what it is not, rather than by what it is. What it is, quite apart
from what any given couple is or does, is the expression in law of
heterosexism and homophobia.
The obvious candidate for the essence of marriage that the Constitution protects is being in love; or, since not even the Constitution can
protect love, it would seem that the essence of being married that makes
it so important to opposite-sex couples lies in the profoundly personal
choice such intimacy represents. 77 If that is true, it is true only to the
extent that one's "choice" is a heterosexual one. When the Constitution
protects but one choice, the act of making that choice is emptied of its
78
value.
The Supreme Court has not spoken to this issue directly but its
opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick is suggestive: "[n]o connection between
family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity
on the other has been demonstrated 79 Bowers underscores the heterosex77Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)

("[,V]e protect the family because it contributes so powerfully to the happiness of
individuals,
not because of a preference for stereotypical households:').
78
Cf. Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in THE
LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES READER 227, 238-39 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993):
[T]o acknowledge that for women heterosexuality may not be a "preference" at
all but something that has had to be imposed, managed, organized, propagandized,
and maintained by force is an immense step to take if you consider yourself freely
and "innately" heterosexual.
79478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
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ism latent in the Court's conception of marriage, but, ironically, it does
so at the expense of putting marriage that much farther from whatever
neutral constitutional moorings it may have had. Marriage, as an individual's personal statement about her intimate relations, no longer exists,
constitutionally.80 In its place is a constitutionally protected right-if not
also a state mandate 8l-to be a heterosexual.
Indeed, the courts that have had the chance to define the essence of
marriage have consistently chosen a single common denominator: heterosexuality. For example, in response to a challenge brought by two women
to Kentucky's refusal to issue them a marriage license, the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky denied that the state had anything to do with their
failure to receive a marriage license.8 2 The two women were
prevented from marrying, not by the statutes of Kentucky or the
refusal of the County Court Clerk of Jefferson County to issue
them a license, but rather by their own8 3incapability of entering
into a marriage as that term is defined.
The Kentucky court, apparently nonplussed by the case, reached this
conclusion based upon its consultation with, among other sources, Webster's New InternationalDictionary and Black's Law Dictionary.8 4 It was,
of course, the definition of.marriage under Kentucky law that the appellants challenged, so the court's reasoning is profoundly circular: their
challenge to the definition of marriage failed because it proposed a new
85
definition.
80 Cf Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 n.3 (1989) (the concept of family
can be expanded, "but it will bear no resemblance to traditionally respected relationshipsand will thus cease to have any constitutional significance-if it is stretched so far as to
include the relationship established between a married woman, her lover, and their child").
81See S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (granting custody of child to
lesbian mother not in child's best interest because child "may have difficulties in achieving
a fulfilling heterosexual identity of her own in the future"); In re Opinion of the Justices,
530 A.2d 21, 25 (N.H. 1987) (exclusion of gays and lesbians from eligibility to serve as
adoptive or foster parents because, inter alia, they would not be good role models does

not violate equal protection).
82

83

Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973).

d. at 589. See also Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974)
(two men denied marriage license not because of their sex but "because of the recognized
definition of that relationship as one which may be entered into only by two persons who
are members
of the opposite sex").
84
Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d at 589.

85 Nan Hunter has observed that judges "seem somewhat astonished at even having to
consider the question of whether the limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples is
constitutionally flawed. These cases tell us nothing about equality or privacy doctrine.
Instead, their holdings are grounded in statements about what the courts believe marriage
is" Hunter, supra note 52, at 13 (footnote omitted).
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The Hallahan court argued that "[a] license to enter into a status or
86
a relationship which the parties are incapable of achieving is a nullity.
This raises an obvious question: a nullity to whom? If the parties themselves were willing to overlook or even embrace the fact that they were
of the same sex-if they felt that they could "achieve" the relationship
with respect to each other-why should the state care? 87 Their relationship
may well have included companionship, affection, support, or sex. The
court concluded, however, that a marriage license must be denied "because what they propose is not a marriage, '88 because what they were was
not an opposite-sex couple.
III. The Marital "Tradition"
The tradition of marriage to which Baehr referred in determining
whether same-sex couples have a right to marry 89 is, among other things,

a tradition of heterosexist hegemony. The history of marriage is not
well-documented, 90 and it is difficult for any court to "know" what marriage is and what it is not, unless that knowledge is not experiential but
idealistic; that is, unless the case is decided not based on what marriage
has been, but rather on what the judge would like marriage to be.
After all, the sentencing court in Loving offered the opinion that
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and
red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the
interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for
the races shows that
such marriages. The fact that he separated
91
he did not intend for the races to mix.
It is difficult to go further back into time than the placement of people
on the planet by "Almighty God," but the United States Supreme Court
was not swayed by that tradition, however dispositive it may have seemed
to Virginia on the question whether "marriage" included interracial mar86

Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d at 589.
7Cf.Graham v. Graham, 33 F. Supp. 936, 938 (E.D. Mich. 1940) ("[M]arriage is not

8

merely a private contract between the parties, but creates a status in which the state is
vitally interested and under which certain rights and duties incident to the relationship

come8 8into being, irrespective of the wishes of the parties.").
89

90

Hallahan,501 S.W.2d at 590.
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 57 (Haw. 1993).

See Eskridge, supra note 50, at 1435 & nn.44-45.

91Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1966). Compare id. with Bowers v. Hardwick,

478 U.S. 186, 210 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ('The parallel between Loving and this
case is almost uncanny. There, too, the State relied on a religious justification for its law.").
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riage. Heterosexuals rely heavily on an idealized marital tradition when
they deny marriage to us, though it reflects neither their experience nor ours.
A. Heterosexual "Traditions" of Marriage
It is unclear whether traditional marriage actually is a tradition for
most opposite-sex couples. Opposite-sex marriages now last an average
of only 9.6 years, 92 and one-third of all marriages are re-marriages. 93 A
considerable number of marriages will end in divorce. 94 Couples with
access to legal services and enough property to make it worthwhile are
able to contract around statutory property allocations.95 Many oppositesex couples choose not to marry at all 96 and often arrange their relationships through non-marital contracts. 97 For a variety of reasons, a significant number of unmarried women have children. 98 American men and
92

1Hunter, supra note 52, at 20 (citing National Center for Health Statistics, Advance
Report for Final Divorce Statistics, 1987, in MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REP. No. 12,
Supp.93 2, 38 (1990)).
1d. (citing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, CHANGING FAMILY PATTERNS IN
THE UNITED STATES 9 (1986)).
94See Barbara Vobejda, Baby-Boom Women Setting Divorce Record: Census Data
Underscore DramaticSocial Change in Last 2 Decades, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 1992, at
Al; see also Desiree French, Second Marriages: Some Work Better, But More Than Half
End in Re-Divorces, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 19, 1989, at 61; Kathleen Doheny, Parents
Divorced-Will
You Too?, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1993, at El.
95
See, e.g., Posner v. Posner, 233 So.2d 381, 385 (Fla. 1970) (reversing prior ruling
to hold prenuptial agreements enforceable); accord Scherer v. Scherer, 292 S.E.2d 662,
666 (Ga. 1982); Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1990); Simeone v.
Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990). See also, e.g., Margaret K. Webb, For Richer,for
Poorer:
Couples Should Talk Money Before Wedding, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1993, at Hi.
96
See Ellen Willis, Say It Loud: Out of Wedlock and Proud, NEWSDAY (New York),
Feb. 11, 1994, at 70 (noting that she and her opposite-sex partner have "resisted marrying,
partly in symbolic protest against the relentless drumbeat for 'family values,' partly
because we feel no need to get the state involved in our relationship, and no irresistible
economic or social pressure to do so!'). See also Kenneth Eskey, Fewer Saying "I Do";
MarriageRate Falling Off in the '90s, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 9, 1992, at A5; Martha
Shirk, MissouriansSaying "IDo"At Slow Rate, ST. Louis PosT-DISPATCH, Aug. 23, 1992,
at IA; Barbara Vobejda, Americans Spending Less Time Married; Rates Are Lowest in 2
Decades
While CohabitationIs Common, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1991, at Al.
97
E.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976).
98
Here, too, courts have blurred the married-unmarried distinction. E.g., Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972) (recognizing unwed father's right to custody of his
children when he and their deceased mother had lived together for 18 years). See also
Robert Pear, LargerNumber of New Mothers Are Unmarried,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1991, at
A20:
[N]early one of every four women who had a child in the last year-913,000 of
3.9 million women-was not married, More than two-thirds of the teen-agers who
had babies last year were unmarried, and among black teen-agers having babies,
only 10 percent were married, the Census Bureau reported ....
Amara Bachu, a demographer at the Census Bureau, said the new data sug-
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women are likely to have more spouses than men and women in polygamous societies. 99 As a consequence, the actual experience of most American families differs considerably from the rhetoric associated with the
family in many judicial opinions. 00
Thus, just as marriage has no theoretical coherence, it also has no
coherence as a shared experience of heterosexuals. These statistics reflect
a shifting population of married people (some of whom are themselves
gay men and lesbians) who have an ambivalent experience of and relation
to marriage. These statistics also show that tradition-based arguments for
the ban on same-sex marriage are disingenuous. There is no coherent
tradition of long-term, monogamous, procreation-oriented marriage among
heterosexuals; rather, opposite-sex couples are abandoning what marriage
has traditionally been and required.
The tradition of heterosexual marriage to which courts like Baehr
refer is not so much an historical, descriptive tradition as it is an ahistorical, prescriptive ideal. What this tradition prescribes is heterosexuality,
but heterosexuality as function, not desire. "Marriage" is framed in terms
of procreation when the question is whether gays should marry; it is
framed in terms of who should marry when the question is whether the
couple should procreate. In either case, procreation leads courts to collapse two distinct issues: deciding whether the state must allow a couple
to marry becomes a determination of whether the state must not allow a
couple to marry.
The supposed bad effect of a parent's homosexuality on his or her
children, a persistent canard, 1 1 justifies denying marriage to same-sex
couples:
gested that there was less of a social stigma attached to bearing children out of
wedlock, so unmarried women who become pregnant nowadays are less likely to
marry.
Many women conclude that they "may be better off in the long run by relying
more on the support of their parents and relatives for financial and emotional
assistance than by entering a potentially unstable marriage undertaken solely to
prevent an out-of-wedlock birth," Miss Bachu said.
Cf. Cheryl Laird, Teen-Age Moms; More Young Mothers Are Choosing to Stay Single,
HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 8, 1992, at 1. See generally Joe Frolik, Brave New World; Single
Motherhood Loses Stigma for Children of Sexual Revolution, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland),
Nov. 30, 1993, at IA; Jean Marbella, Unwed Mothers: What a Turnaround; In Days Past
They Were Shunned, But Now the Reaction Is "So What", ST. Louis POST-DIsPATCH, June

14, 1993, at 3D.
99

LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT: SPOUSES, LOVERS, AND THE LAW

104-204 (1981).
100 Only One U.S. Family in Four is "Traditional", N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1991, at A19.

101 E.g., J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 867, 869 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (ignoring
expert testimony that 95% of adult-child sexual molestation is heterosexual: "Every trial

judge... knows that the molestation of minor boys by adult males is not as uncommon
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marriage is so clearly related to the public interest in affording
a favorable environment for the growth of children that we are
unable to say that there is not a rational basis upon which the
state may limit the protection of its marriage laws to the legal
02
union of one man and one woman.
Marriage is a legal relation between adults; the extent to which children
benefit from it depends upon the substance of the relationships among
children and adults. Thus, happily unmarried persons may well provide a
more "favorable" environment for children than an unhappily married
couple. None of the supposed child-rearing strengths that are used to
argue in favor of marriage are guaranteed by marriage, nor are they
unavailable to unmarried people, except to the extent that the state makes
child-rearing by an unmarried person difficult.
Notwithstanding the freedom to make reproductive choices that Roe
v. Wade, 0 3 Eisenstadt v. Baird,04 and Griswold v. Connecticut'0 5 established, opposite-sex couples participate in a scheme of procreative regulation by the very act of introducing their bodies into marriage. That
scheme deploys children as symbols of procreation, itself a symbol of
"normal" sexuality.
as the psychological experts' testimony indicated."). But see, e.g., Marianne T. O'Toole,
Note,02Gay Parenting:Myths and Realities, 9 PACE L. REV. 129, 144-45 (1989).
I Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). See also Bruce Fein,
Gay Marriage: Should Homosexual Marriages Be Recognized Legally?, A.B.A. J.,Jan.

1990, at 42, 43:
The law should encourage male-female marriage vows over homosexual attachments in the interests of physically, mentally, and psychologically healthy children, the nation's most valuable asset.
Fein's unwarranted assumption is that encouraging opposite-sex marriages over "homosexual attachments" (as though the two were mutually exclusive) can alter an individual's
experience of desire.
[N]o evidence exists to support the belief that banning homosexual marriages will
promote heterosexual relationships. Most homosexuals prohibited from marrying
will simply continue their homosexual relationship without official state recognition. Homosexuals will not reorient their affectional preference and marry a
person of the other gender.
Cathy J. Jones, The Rights to Marry and Divorce: A New Look at Some Unanswered

Questions, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 577, 622 (1985). If it is true that same-sex marriage would
lead to an appreciable increase in the number of gay people, then that suggests that many
people, perhaps even many married people, are in relationships they would leave if they
could. That it traps people in unhappy and unsatisfying relationships is not the most
compelling case to be made for marriage.
103410 U.S. 113 (1973).
104405 U.S. 438 (1972).
105381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Courts also argue that same-sex couples must not marry because they
cannot procreate. 10 6 Marriage, then, is "for" procreation, 10 7 even though
married opposite-sex couples are not required to procreate or even to try
to do so.10 8 The wide range of non-coital means of becoming a parentfrom in vitro fertilization to surrogacy to adoption-means marriage no
longer requires or implies a link between sexuality and parenthood for
many couples. On the other hand, polygamous marriages, which maximize procreation, are prohibited. 10 9 And, conversely, interracial marriage
was opposed precisely because such a couple could procreate." 0
It is a little surprising that heterosexuals have done to themselves
what they so frequently do to gays and lesbians: namely, distill heterosexuality into one of its practices (procreation in marriage), in the same
111
way that homosexuality is conflated with one of its practices (sodomy).
One suspects few heterosexuals experience heterosexuality in this one-di106E.g., Singer, 522 P.2d at 1197 ("[lIt is apparent that no same-sex couple offers the
possibility of the birth of children by their union. Thus the refusal of the state to authorize
same-sex marriages results from such impossibility of reproduction... "). That same-sex
couples do not have children is, of course, untrue. See, e.g., Nancy Polikoff, This Child
Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in
Lesbian-Mother and Other NontraditionalFamilies, 78 GEo. L.J. 459 (1990); The Lesbian
Baby Boom, NEWSDAY, July 13, 1989, at 8; Gay Couples Begin a Baby Boom, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 6, 1989, at 2.
107 E.g., Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1, 7 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (denying custody
of children to lesbian mother, and noting that "[t]he essence of marriage is the coming
together of a man and woman for the purpose of procreation and the rearing of children,
thus creating what we know to be the traditional family").
IOSSee, e.g., Singer, 522 P.2d at 1197 (conceding that "married persons are not
required to have children or even to engage in sexual relations"); see also Marks v. Marks,
77 N.Y.S.2d 269, 270-71 (Kings County Sup. Ct. 1948) (opposite-sex couples may marry
even though they know in advance that they cannot procreate).
109 E.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) (upholding conviction
of Mormon settler on charges of polygamy, rejecting free exercise claim).
I 0Hence the concern over "mongrelization." See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7
(1966).
"' See, e.g., Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073, 1075-76 (5th Cir.
1976) (relying on state sodomy statute to affirm newspaper's decision not to print
advertisements for gay organization on grounds that newspaper would become implicated
in criminal activity), cert. denied 430 U.S. 982 (1977); Appeal in Pima County Juvenile
Action B-10489, 727 P.2d 830, 835 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (relying on state sodomy statute
to determine bisexual man is "unacceptable" to adopt any child); Head v. Newton, 596
S.W.2d 209, 210 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980) (calling someone "queer" slander per se since it
implies commission of the crime of sodomy); Gay Activists v. Lomenzo, 320 N.Y.S.2d
994, 997 (Sup. Ct. 1971) ("[I]n order to be a homosexual, the prohibited act must have at
some time been committed, or at least presently contemplated.'), rev'd sub nom. Owles
v. Lomenzo, 329 N.Y.S.2d 181 (App. Div. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Gay Activists Alliance
v. Lomenzo, 293 N.E.2d 255 (1973). See also Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080, 1084
(1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) ("[T]he question is not whether Gay
Lib as an organization will abide by university regulations. Nor is it really whether Gay
Lib will persuasively advocate violations of the sodomy statute. Instead, the question is
whether a university can deny recognition to an organization the activities of which expert
psychologists testify will in and of themselves lead directly to violations of a concededly
valid state criminal law.").
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mensional, idealized way. Shifting the procreation argument to gays and
lesbians betrays its deeper structure: marriage, as a statement about who
should or can procreate, negatively defines who should or can belong to
"our" community. 12
In the same way that Virginia feared that all whites would be less
white if some of them intermarried with non-whites,"' Georgia argued in
defense of its sodomy law that homosexual sodomy would somehow make
heterosexuals less heterosexual. According to the Attorney General of
Georgia, sodomy is the
anathema of the basic units of our society-marriage and the
family. To decriminalize or artificially withdraw the public's
expression of its disdain for this conduct does not uplift sodomy,
but rather demotes these sacred institutions to merely alternative
114
lifestyles.
Thus, the "sacredness" of marriage stems not from a quality essential to
marriage but from its oppositional relation to "non-marriage," rendered
as homosexual sodomy.
B. Same-Sex Traditions of "Marriage"

If in a tradition-based test the relevant tradition is always to be that
of the dominant caste, and if the question is whether the dominant tradition has included the practices of the subordinate group, then it is clear
that challenges to the exclusion of those practices must always fail except
insofar as the subordinate tradition can show that it resembles the dominant tradition. If, however, the question is whether a tradition of the
practices claimed by the minority group has existed, then a challenge to
the exclusion of those practices need only fail if the practices of the
dominant caste are necessary and necessarily exclude those of the minority group.
112

Cf. Leo Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave?, in AIDS: CULTURAL ANALYSIS/CULTURAL AcTivisM 197, 203 (Douglas Crimp ed., 1988) ("[Tlhe definition of the family as
an identity is, inherently, an exclusionary process.").
113Loving, 388 U.S. at 7. The Virginia Supreme Court relied on its decision in Naim
v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), in which it had held that anti-miscegenation laws
"'preserve the racial integrity of its citizens"' and prevent "'a mongrel breed of citizens."'
Naim, 487 S.E.2d at 756.
" Brief of Petitioner Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General of Georgia, at 37-38,
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140) (quoted in Sylvia A. Law,
Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187, 219). See also
RICHARD D. MOHR, GAY IDEAS: OUTING AND OTHER CONTROVERSIES (1992). Mohr writes
that the same-sex marriage cases
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Judicial application of tradition-based fundamental rights tests obscures a tradition in this country of same-sex pairings that resembledand the partners treated as-"marriage"'1 5 The same-sex marriage cases
themselves are evidence that same-sex couples have formed relationships
whose "sacrifice" would extinguish their "liberty." 116 Same-sex couples
have attempted to secure for themselves some of the benefits of marriage
through a variety of legal mechanisms, including adoption, 117 contract,' 18
presume[ ] that marriage, like titanium, is somehow a scarce commodity, the
possession of which by one person necessarily excludes its possession by
someone else-rather than that marriage is, as it is, a common good, like
friendship or knowledge, that any number of people may possess and of which
the possession by some may actually promote its possession by others.
Id. at 89-90.
"'5Professor Eskridge has written a detailed survey of same-sex relationships. See
generally Eskridge, supra note 50. For example, Professor Eskridge describes male-male
couples among pirates, hobos, cowboys, and Native Americans. Id. at 1453, 1476 &
nn.205-07. Additionally, a wide variety of religions have recognized same-sex couples.
E.g., Lynda Richardson, Methodist CongregationBlesses Lesbian Couple's Union, WASH.
POST, May 11, 1990, at Cl; John Dart, Support Grows Among Clergy for "Weddings" of
Gay Couples, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1987, at 3. In Harlem, lesbian couples would have large
weddings for themselves. LILLIAN FADERMAN, ODD GIRLS AND TWILIGHT LOVERS: A
HISTORY OF LESBIAN LIFE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 73 (1991); see also Cheryl

Clarke, Of Althea and Flaxie, in GAY & LESBIAN POETRY IN OUR TIME 77, 79 (Carl Morse
& Joan Larkin eds., 1988) (telling story of two women, each of whom "did not care who
knew she'd made her way with a woman").
Some have estimated that half of all gay men and 70% of all lesbians are involved in
long-term relationships. See, e.g., Julienne C. Scocca, Society's Ban on Same-Sex Marriages:A Reevaluation of the So-Called "FundamentalRight" ofMarriage,2 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 719, 720 (1992) (citing Brent Hartinger, A Casefor Gay Marriage,COMMONWEAL, Nov. 22, 1991, at 681). Statistics such as these, however, should be taken with a
grain of salt, since we know neither how many gay men and lesbians there are in this
country6 nor how they individually define their relationships.
11Cf. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 57 (Haw. 1993) (holding that same-sex marriage
is not "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would
exist if
7 it were sacrificed").
It See, e.g., East 53rd St. Assocs. v. Mann, 503 N.Y.S.2d 752, 755 (1986) (order of
adoption intended to secure inheritance rights of adoptee not fraud per se); In re Adoption
of Adult Anonymous 1, 435 N.Y.S.2d 527, 531 (Fam. Ct. 1981) (no public policy bar to
adoption between competent and consenting adults in same-sex relationship). But see, e.g.,
In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424, 427 (N.Y. 1984) (adoption statute
restricted to the parent-child context and should not be extended to legitimizing adult
relationships absent authorization from legislature).
"8 See, e.g., Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645, 646 (Ga. 1992) (holding contract to
share assets and expenses between same-sex couple enforceable; invoking parol evidence
rule to refuse to read sexual component into contract); Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 405, 407 (Ct. App. 1988) (same-sex cohabitators' agreement enforceable even though
sexual relationship was part of the consideration); but see Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr.
130, 133-34 (Ct. App. 1981) (declining to enforce oral cohabitators' agreement between
two men where sex was part of the consideration therefor). The Whorton court distinguished Daly on the grounds that the sexual relationship contemplated in the Whorton
agreement was severable from the rest of the agreement. Whorton, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
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judicial statutory construction," 9 or common law construction. 20 Each of
these cases testifies to a history of same-sex love, whose participants have
risked and lost a great deal in order not to lose their sense of their love's
worth.' 2' Beyond the legal system, an uncounted number of gays and
lesbians quietly defy the hegemony of heterosexuality by creating and
sustaining same-sex relationships.
Whatever these relationship are, however, they are not "marriage,"
even if they are long-term, monogamous, or procreation-oriented. If we
insist on the conflicting, heterosexist definitions of "marriage," we do our
own history a disservice by accepting a term defined by our exclusion,
and one that cannot describe all the ways we have formed our relationships.
Whether or not it happens in Hawaii, it seems likely that same-sex
marriage, of at least some form, is on the horizon.1 22 The question is less
119See, e.g., State v. Hadinger, 573 N.E.2d 1191, 1192 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (same-sex
couple in a "spousal relationship" for purposes of domestic violence statute); Braschi v.
Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989) (defining long-term same-sex couple
as a "family" for purposes of New York City rent-control laws); 420 East 80th Co. v. Chin,
455 N.Y.S.2d 42, 44 (App. Term. 1982) (barring eviction of tenant's same-sex partner
because shortage of housing in New York City forced groups other than nuclear families
to share apartments), aff'd 468 N.Y.S.2d 9 (App. Div. 1983). But see, e.g., In re Estate of
Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684, 688 (Surr. Ct. 1990) (surviving partner of same-sex relationship
not a "surviving spouse" within meaning of statute providing that surviving spouse may
elect 20against will).
1 See, e.g., Rowe v. Bennett, 514 A.2d 802, 806 (Mo. 1986) (allowing emotional
distress action against psychotherapist who dated plaintiff's same-sex partner after the
couple went through counseling with her). But see, e.g., Coon v. Joseph, 237 Cal. Rptr
873, 877 (Ct. App. 1987) (intimate same-sex relation not a sufficiently "close relationship"
for purposes of negligent infliction of emotional distress). Cf. Gajovski v. Gajovski, 610
N.E.2d 431, 432 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (affirming lower court's refusal to terminate
alimony when former wife began living with another woman on grounds that lesbians
cannot marry and cannot be "concubines" to one another).
121See, e.g., Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247, 256 (9th Cir.
1976) (Singer, plaintiff in Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), terminated
by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in part as result of publicity surrounding
his attempt to secure a marriage license), vacated, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977); McConnell v.
Anderson, 451 F.2d 193, 196 (8th Cir. 1971) (upholding withdrawal of offer of promotion
following publicity surrounding the attempt of McConnell and Baker, plaintiff in Baker V.
Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), to secure a marriage license); Shahar v. Bowers,
58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 668, 668 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (Bowers, Attorney General of
Georgia and defendant in Bowers v. Hardwick, 487 U.S. 186 (1986), withdrew offer of
employment to Shahar after she went through marriage ceremony with another woman);
see also, e.g., In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790, 791 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
(custody of Kowalski, brain-damaged in automobile accident, awarded to her female
partner after years of litigation that lasted almost twice as long as the length of their
relationship
at the time of the accident).
122 See Hunter, supra note 52, at 10 ("[Tlhere is a rapidly developing sense that the
legalization of marriage for lesbian and gay Americans is politically possible at some
unknown but not unreachable point in the future, that it shimmers or lurks-depending on
one's point of view-on the horizon of the law.").
Denmark now permits "registered partnerships" that resemble marriage, and Sweden
recognizes "co-habitees" See Sheila Rule, Rights for Gay Couples in Denmark, N.Y.
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one of when than of whether: "[g]iven that a same-sex marriage bar is a
bad thing for the state to impose, lesbians and gay men
still need to ask
123
whether marriage is a good thing for them to seek."
At least one commentator hopes that legal same-sex marriage will
make heterosexuals see that gays and lesbians are, just like them, nice
people. 24 I hope so, too, and why not? But it seems optimistic, and it
essentializes law's power.
The argument that legally recognizing same-sex relationships as
marriages will force our society to confront its deeply rooted
sexist, heterosexist, and repressed beliefs about human sexuality
and stimulate a complete rethinking of sexual relations is, I
think, a brave but ultimately misdirected political strategy ....
I worry whether the existence of a group of married lesbians and
gay men can really revolutionize the institution of marriage. My
concern arises from the fact that this argument is precisely the
same as that used by reactionary groups 1against
legal recognition
25
of same-sex relationships as marriages.
If marriage can work the social magic of "legitimizing" same-sex relationships, it is only at the cost of a massive conscription of lesbians and
gay men into the project of re-writing gay life.
Proponents of same-sex marriage argue that such marriages make the
law recognize new forms of relationships. This, however, is mistaken:
marriage reforms our relationships in a way the state already recognizes.
"[W]hat we 'win' when we wage a fight for freedom is often something
quite different than we may have intended": 126 to gain same-sex marriage
from a sexist and heterosexist legal establishment, we will have to be "the

TIMEs, Oct. 2, 1989, at A8; Eva Ahlberg, Live-In Lovers in Sweden, Including Gays, Given
Same Rights as Married Couples, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1988, at 15. Six countries-Aus-

tralia, Denmark, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden-will acknowledge
same-sex partnerships of several years' duration for purposes of immigration and resi-

dency. See Arthur S. Leonard, More Countries Recognize Gay Partnersfor Immigration,
1991 LESBIAN/GAY L. NOTES 82.
123Duclos, supra note 71, at 42 (footnote omitted). See also Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since
When Is Marriagea Path to Liberation?, 2 OUT/LOOK, NAT'L LESBIAN & GAY Q. 9, 14

(1989) ("Marriage, as it exists today, is antithetical to my liberation as a lesbian and as a
woman because it mainstreams my life and voice. I do not want to be known as 'Mrs.
Attached-To-Somebody-Else."').
124 See Claudia A. Lewis, From This Day Forward: A Feminine Moral Discourse on
Homosexual Marriage, 97 YALE L.J. 1783, 1800 & n.94 (1988) (recounting story of
lesbian friend and her partner who had a baby and, as a result of the birth announcement,

were able to make new connections to the author's family).

'2 5 Duclos, supra note 71, at 46-47 (footnotes omitted).
126Mary C. Dunlap, The Lesbian and Gay Marriage Debate: A Microcosm of Our

Hopes and Troubles in the Nineties, 1 LAw &

SEXUALITY

63, 91 (1991).

528

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

[Vol. 29

same" as heterosexuals. 127 That is, as the same-sex marriage cases demonstrate, we will have to show that our relationships are "the same" as
the idealized heterosexual relationships courts envision when they deny
marriage to us. The imposition of this ideal on gay and lesbian relationships will then more deeply inscribe certain differences within our own
communities, delegitimizing some of us in the eyes of other gays and
lesbians in the name of legitimizing all of us in the eyes of heterosexuals.
The specter of lesbian marriage and lesbian quasi-marriage...
poses the danger of demarcating acceptable lesbians (married
couples) from unacceptable lesbians (unmarried), as well as
threatens to hetero-relationize and erase lesbianism. 28
Thus, when newspapers begin to publish "wedding" announcements for
same-sex couples, 129 a victory of sorts has been won, but it is not the
defeat of the mechanisms by which we have been oppressed.
It seems speculative to hope that seeing our wedding announcements
in the paper will cause our families to accept our homosexuality if they
have previously been hostile to the idea. The opposite result seems much
more likely. Ask any heterosexual who has made a marriage of which her
family disapproves: legal marriage does not guarantee acceptance by one's
family. The work of gaining community acceptance for our relationships
must still be done the hard way, family by family.
So long as we allow heterosexuals to define which relationships
matter, we will gain only marginally by squeezing a few of our number
into their model. Some say that, in a time of AIDS, marriage is the most
crucial battle, because it will save us from danger.' 30 I do not believe this
is so, nor do I believe it is the most compelling case to be made for
marriage; it is a little like the argument for restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples in the first place. Marriage will not protect us from
127See Lewis, supra note 124, at 1785 (discussing the "impoverished" Equal Protection ideal). Cf Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("'[Freedom] to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a
mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that
touch the heart of the existing order."') (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)); Dunlap, supra note 126, at 93 ("People should not have to be
'the same' to have equal rights, and, indeed, where we are 'the same,' questions of equality
do not28 tend to arise.").
1 Ruthann Robson & S.E. Valentine, Lov(h)ers: Lesbians as Intimate Partnersand
Lesbian Legal Theory, 63 TEMP. L. REv. 511, 540 (1990).
129Paper Includes Gay Couples on What Was Wedding Page, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 23,

1991, at A10 (Minneapolis Star Tribune publishing same-sex domestic partnership announcements on wedding announcement page); note that the New York Times itself
publishes
only opposite-sex wedding announcements.
130 See, e.g., LARRY KRAMER, THE NORMAL HEART 30 (1985) ("[W]hy didn't you guys
fight for the right to get married instead of the right to legitimize promiscuity?").
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danger; indeed it very often exposes us to danger. AIDS has shown that
our suffering can leave heterosexuals unmoved-why should they be
moved by our loving? Those friends who have died of AIDS are irretrievably gone. Gone, and marriage won't bring them back; nor will it challenge the sexual value system that condemned them and all of us as
"promiscuous" and complicit in our fate.
IV. Beyond Marriage
Marriage has been described as having "positive values," and contributing to "community stability."' 31 That the state has an interest in
promoting marriage because of the social good marriage does is a circular
argument, since marriage only performs those goods because the state
assigns them to marriage or gives it a monopoly on them. Given the
number of social evils for which marriage has provided an opportunity
(such as spousal abuse and rape), 132 it seems equally plausible to argue
that the state has an interest in preventing marriage.1 33 The issue, then, is
what the goals of state regulation of intimate relationships can or ought
to be.
Same-sex couples who cannot marry, like opposite-sex couples who
do not marry, are materially disadvantaged by the lack of the various
benefits states give to married couples. That, however, is less an argument
for extending marriage to same-sex couples than for re-thinking the distribution of certain benefits through marriage. Latent in the discussion of
same-sex marriage, and of marriage generally, is the unanswered question
131See Lewis, supra note 124, at 1802 (arguing that these values "are not exclusive

to the32heterosexual relationship").

1 E.g., Attacks on Women by Husbands, Lovers Widespread, Senate Says, CH. TRiB.,

Oct. 3, 1992, at 14 (citing Senate Judiciary Committee report estimating 1 million attacks
on women by their husbands or lovers and 3 million unreported domestic crimes, including
murders, rapes, and assaults).
133Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that states must "prevent"

marriage to the extent that it legally consists of classifications that presume that husbands
will act as privileged breadwinners and wives as subordinated homemakers. See, e.g.,
Kirschberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981) (Louisiana code section designating
husband as "head and master" of community estate unconstitutional); Trammel v. United

States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980) (allowing voluntary adverse spouse testimony in criminal
trial over defendant-spouse's objection); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 280 (1979) (striking
down statute imposing fiat ban on alimony to men); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199,
206-07 (1977) (women entitled to same Social Security benefits as men); Planned
Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976) (state may not require
husband's consent for first trimester abortion); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,
645 (1975) (widowers entitled to same child care allowances as widows); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973) (enlisted women entitled to same military

benefits as enlisted men). See also, e.g., Warren v. State, 336 S.E.2d 221, 221 (Ga. 1985)
(marriage not a defense to marital rape); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 375-76 (N.J. 1984)

(allowing expert testimony on battered women's syndrome).
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of how certain entitlements should be distributed, and how certain inequities are to be remedied.
As I have argued, same-sex marriage is a limited and speculative
answer to this question. Speculative, both because the bundle of marital
benefits can be given to us in a disjointed and inferior package and
because it is unclear that it can change homophobic attitudes. Limited,
both because it assumes a false symmetry between gays and lesbians and
heterosexuals and because it makes the issue the narrow one of our access
to the status quo.
The all-or-nothing marriage model, which serves heterosexuals so
poorly, serves us even less well. We know, as gays and lesbians, that love
is not always erotic and that what is erotic is not always love, and that
the two of these in turn can be separate issues from questions of support
and companionship. Yet these links are precisely what a two-person,
monogamous model of marriage imposes. What of our circles of ex-lovers, our fuck-buddies, our housemates, our co-parents, our parents-our
friends, the literal substance of our community-what of them? "Marriage" tangles questions of eros and love and economic dependency in a
way that leaves us with little vocabulary for any relationship in which
these are not present in heavy doses. I, for one, am against that.
We would do well not to romanticize marriage, for to do so is to
romanticize the means of our oppression. Our desire for same-sex marriage is a radical affirmation of heterosexuals' idealized social order, the
very social order by which they oppress us. Marriage is not the same thing
as love. For their part, heterosexuals have shown us what marriage is
worth and how long it lasts. For our part, we have learned from our outlaw
status a great deal about love-what it is worth, and how long it lasts. 134
Rather than accept the narrowness under which heterosexuals themselves
chafe, why not invite them to share in what we know about the multiple
ways in which relationships can form? If we come to heterosexuals and
their institution, we valorize the mechanism of our oppression. Let them
come to us.
-Steven

K. Homer*

34

1 Cf Douglas Crimp, How to Have Promiscuityin an Epidemic, in AIDS: CULTURAL
ANALYSIS/CULTURAL ACTIVISM, supra note 112, at 253 ("We were able to invent safe sex

because we have always known that sex is not, in an epidemic or not, limited to penetrative
sex. Our promiscuity taught us many things, not only about the pleasures of sex, but about
the great multiplicity of those pleasures.").
* For critical eyes and listening ears, I am grateful to Professor Martha Minow, Linda
Dunn, Robin Lenhardt, and Eric Tsuchida. I have had a series of conversations about this
Note with Professor David Chambers, Norman Carlin, Dan Caul, Ken Halpern, Brad Sears,
Rachel Sturman, Julie Su, and Carlos Vasquez, without which both it and I would be the
poorer. I must also thank William Rubenstein for his course Sexual Orientation and the
Law, in which these ideas began to form. Beyond all this, for the patience and intelligence
she brought to editing this Note, I am indebted to Alison Wheeler.

